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This article gives a broad overview of the fundamental right of social assistance. The central
question is to what extent the fundamental right to social assistance can count on universal rec-
ognition and what legal consequences are drawn from this right when it is invoked in national
courts. In order to answer this question, we have looked at this right from a global, a regional
(Europe and Africa) and a national perspective (Germany, the Netherlands and South Africa). On
the basis of this study we discern a broad synergy in the normative context, not only transgressing
through but also operating above the national constitutional jurisdictions. It is observed that from a
legal perspective the added value of this right lies in the possibility for an individual to address
structural shortcomings in the existing architecture of social assistance schemes. This possibility
places courts in the position to critically review the system in the light of human rights
requirements.
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Is social assistance a human right? Yes, it is. Sometimes it is seen as part of the right to social
security or some other fundamental right, but equally often it is formulated as a separate, inde-
pendent right. In essence, it regards an obligation on the part of the state to provide minimum
protection to needy persons who are unable to take care of themselves in any other way.
Over the past decades, more attention has been paid to the human right to social security.1 But,
the fundamental right of social assistance has hardly been the subject of any separate academic
interest.2 The purpose of this article is to break this silence by giving a broad overview of the
position, content and functioning of the fundamental right to social assistance. We are in particular
interested in the question of whether the fundamental right to social assistance has gained universal
recognition and what the legal consequences are when this right is invoked before the national
courts.
In order to answer this question, we will look at the fundamental right of social assistance in a
global, a regional and a national context. As the space available to us in this issue of the journal is
not unlimited, we had to narrow the focus of our investigation. We have chosen to pay attention to
two very different regions in which the fundamental right of social assistance plays a vibrant role,
i.e. Europe (which has a long-standing tradition of income support programmes for needy citizens)
and Africa (where such programmes are now increasingly being introduced). As far as Europe is
concerned, the situation of two countries will be contrasted: Germany which has developed robust
constitutional guarantees and the Netherlands where such guarantees are mostly toothless in
practice. As for Africa, we will look specifically at the situation in the Republic of South Africa,
where the constitution guarantees a right to access appropriate social assistance and where the
Constitutional Court has been active in promoting social assistance rights.
We start off by giving a very brief overview of the place of social assistance in our social
security systems and the major policy frameworks for social assistance in the two continents
(Section 2 ‘Setting the scene: the function of social assistance in the wider context of the welfare
state and social protection’). Then we present an overview of global and regional clauses in
fundamental rights catalogues that recognise the right to social assistance (Section 3 ‘The place
of the fundamental right of social assistance’). Next, we zoom in on the legal nature of the
governmental obligations created by the fundamental right to social assistance (Section 4 ‘Legal
nature of the fundamental right of social assistance’). This is followed by an exploration of the
substantive meaning of the fundamental right to social assistance, as elaborated by international
supervisory bodies, in particular the European Committee for Social Rights (ECSR Section 5
‘Substantive meaning of the fundamental right of social assistance’). We then address the appli-
cation of the fundamental right in the three selected countries: Germany (Section 6.1), the Nether-
lands (Section 6.2) and South Africa (Section 6.3). We conclude by answering the central research
question raised above (Section 7 ‘Conclusions’).
1. Cf. inter alia Heredero (2007), Riedel (2007), the respective contributions of Eberhard Eichenhofer, Lieneke Sling-
enberg, George Katrougalos, Ida Elisabeth Koch and Frans Pennings in Pennings and Vonk (2015), and Leijten (2018).
2. There are some exceptions. For example Sepu´lveda and Nyst (2012). Other relevant publications are often written from
the perspective of national doctrine, for example Germany and South Africa, which established strong constitutional
guarantees. Cf. infra Section 6.
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Setting the scene: the function of social assistance in the wider context
of the welfare state and social protection
Europe
General social assistance systems in Europe are often direct successors to the pre-war systems of
poor relief. These systems expressed a form of governmental charity and provided an organisa-
tional and financial framework for supporting poor people at local level, strictly on the basis of
subsidiarity and discretion and subject to harsh working conditions for the able bodied. After the
war, the basis for support changed: from charity to a right. Although this does not preclude a
margin of local administrative discretion, such schemes nevertheless offer a general safety net
based on a legally defined right to statutorily regulated minimum subsistence benefits.3 Social
assistance schemes in Europe come under different names, but they are mostly characterised by a
means test and flat rate minimum benefit levels. Furthermore, they do not attach any conditions as
to previous periods of insurance or the payment of contributions. The schemes are financed from
general taxation.
Countries that operate with a general social assistance system have often introduced other
minimum income schemes for special groups, which are very similar to social assistance, but that
work with a gentler means test. Such schemes are sometimes referred to as ‘special non-
contributory benefits’ in typical EU jargon.4
Not all developed countries have a general social assistance system. For example, Southern
European countries such as Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal traditionally have a fragmented
system of separate means-tested schemes for specific groups, ranging from the elderly, orphans
and the disabled to earthquake victims.5 The absence of a general safety net is sometimes explained
by the large degree of family solidarity that traditionally exists in the southern European countries.
It must also be noted that there are also countries with general social assistance schemes that
operate with levels that are considerably lower than the average European standard, both in
absolute and relative terms. This is the case for some Eastern European countries.
Social assistance is a species of the wider concept of social security, just as social insurance,
health care benefits and family benefits are. The constitutions of all European countries, with the
exception of the UK which does not have a written constitution, dedicate one or more provisions
related to the project of social security. Their nature and specific formulation are very different, but
on the whole they converge around three main approaches: affirming social security as an indi-
vidual right of a human being; defining the social responsibility of the State in social security
provisions; and placing social security among the guiding principles of state policy.6 If we scan the
constitutional provisions of 47 European states,7 it appears that a substantial number contain
3. For a systematic overview of the systems of national social assistance operating in Europe, see inter alia Bahle, Hubl and
Pfeifer (2011).
4. Or, according to the literal text of Article 70 Regulation 883/2004: Special non-contributory benefits. Cf. furthermore
Verschueren (2009: 1-2).
5. Italy has introduced a general social assistance system in 2017. In Spain, only Catalonia operated a general social
assistance scheme, but since 2011 this scheme pays only a range of benefits for very needy people. For a general
overview cf. Frazier and Marlier (2015).
6. Egorov and Wujczyk (2016).
7. Neatly brought together in alphabetical order in an ILO document: Alabasio (2012).
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specific references to social assistance, either directly referring to the term or indirectly by for-
mulating duties to provide protection, support or welfare services to needy persons, poor families
or other vulnerable groups.
For the EU, the main policy challenge is to realise a universal guaranteed minimum income in
all countries up to the level of the poverty line, accompanied by well-functioning activation and re-
integration regimes.8 The question is very much how to find budget, political consensus and EU
powers to realise this ideal.
Africa
While there is no tradition of general public income support systems in Africa, nowadays social
assistance has increasingly, particularly in recent years, become a significant policy tool for
addressing vulnerability, social exclusion and more generally social injustice. It should be borne
in mind that the traditional preference for social insurance found in European countries is not
always suitable to meet the needs of African countries today. In particular, the size of the informal
economic sector in these countries poses a problem. The rudimentary social insurance systems that
have developed in poorer countries cover individuals who work in the formal economy, such as
civil servants and employees in regulated sectors. However, the large majority of such populations
work in the informal sector and this sector is still growing. As long as this is the case, expansion of
social insurance to broader layers of the population remains an illusion – save for recent attempts to
develop dedicated insurance-based mechanisms to reach sizeable parts of those who work in the
informal economy.9 The non-contributory approach which is characteristic of social assistance
may offer an alternative, although this also raises concerns about affordability given the consid-
erable numbers of those who work in the informal sector.
Also, in Africa, the growing view is that social assistance is a government responsibility, and no
longer a matter of charity, or as something relegated to the informal forms of social support that
have traditionally characterised social and economic survival of African communities and house-
holds. This is evidenced by an explicit reflection on the scope and function of social assistance in
the ever-expanding number of social protection policies and strategies that are now to be found in a
large number of African countries, and the exponential growth in state-executed social assistance
transfer programmes in Africa, especially since 2006 – by 2015 no less than 114 such programmes
had been recorded.10
The policy emphasis on social assistance is also reflected in the specific guarantee of social
assistance indicated – either directly or indirectly – in a number of (mostly) recent African con-
stitutions,11 and is increasingly accompanied by specific social assistance laws, which give effect
to the constitutional guarantee.12 The constitutional guarantee of social assistance is indeed a
growing phenomenon, as also appears from the South African example discussed more fully later
8. Vandenbroucke, Cantillon, Van Mechelen, Goedeme´ and Van Lancker (2012).
9. See Barrientos (2007: 99).
10. See Dafuleya (2018). See also Sabates-Wheeler, Abdulai, Wilmink, de Groot, and Spadafora (2017).
11. Based on the analysis of one of the authors of this contribution, the constitutions of 14 African countries provide
explicitly for either ‘‘social welfare’’ or ‘‘social assistance’’.
12. Social Assistance Act 2013 (Kenya); Social Assistance Act 2004 (South Africa). See the discussion in Olivier (2019).
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in this article. For example, Article 38 of the Tunisian Constitution (2014) stipulates that the state
shall guarantee the right to social assistance in accordance with the law.13
Several of these constitutional texts emphasise the individual entitlement to social assistance – a
central element of a rights-based approach. Other constitutional provisions place an emphasis on
the duty of the State to take action. Some constitutions contain provisions that highlight both an
individual’s entitlement and the duty to provide imposed on the State.14 Yet, it has also been
remarked that in reality, many governments are apprehensive of the fiscal costs and the potential
legal challenges that are associated with a rights-based approach.15 As noted in a 2013 study
assessing social protection programmes in sub-Saharan Africa, social assistance schemes or pro-
grammes often lack a proper legal mandate.16
The place of the fundamental right of social assistance
Global standards
Global fundamental rights catalogues such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) do not contain any
direct references to the term social assistance. These catalogues formulate a right to social security
(Article 22 Universal Declaration and Article 9 ICESCR) and a right to an adequate standard of
living (Article 25 Universal Declaration and Article 11 ICESCR). It is as if this latter right
recognises the underlying objective of providing a minimum subsistence level without linking it
to a general assistance scheme as an instrument. But according to the Committee of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the right to social security of Art. 9 ICESCR includes an
obligation for states to work towards a non-contributory safety net. This not only follows from
General Comment No. 9 on the right to social security,17 but also from the 2018 communication of
a complaint procedure in Marcia Cecilia Trujillo Calero v. Ecuador, which touched on the lack of
retirement provisions in Ecuador for women. In this particular context the CECR held that:
In accordance with their core obligations with regard to the right to social security as established in the
Covenant [ . . . ], States should provide non-contributory old-age benefits, social services and other
assistance for all older persons who, when reaching the retirement age prescribed in national legisla-
tion, have not completed a qualifying period of contributions or are not otherwise entitled to an old-age
insurance-based pension or other social security benefit or assistance, and have no other source of
income. [ . . . ]18
13. Other examples increasingly abound. Article 43 of the Kenyan Constitution (2010) provides that every person has the
right to social security and specifies this to include what would typically be covered by social assistance measures:
‘‘The State shall provide appropriate social security to persons who are unable to support themselves and their
dependents’’. (Constitution of Kenya (2010) art 43(3)). Similarly, art 17 of the 2014 Egyptian Constitution stipulates
that ‘‘[A]ll citizens who have no access to the social security system have the right to social security to ensure a decent
life, if they are unable to support themselves and their families in the event of incapacity to work, old age or
unemployment’’.
14. In particular, the Ethiopian, Kenyan and South African constitutions. See Olivier (2019).
15. See Devereux (2017: 11-32 at 12, 30).
16. Olivier, Adrianarison and McLaughlin (2013: 31).
17. Infra section 4.
18. ECSR Marcia Cecilia Trujillo Calero v. Ecuador, Case 10/2015, 26 March 2018 Consideration 14.2.
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Curiously, the ILO does not have its own instrument containing minimum standards with regard
to the scope and architecture of social assistance. The paradigmatic social security convention, No.
102 from 1952, is based on an implicit preference for social insurance, because the minimum
standards are linked to the various social risks that are typically covered by social insurance
schemes (unemployment, sickness, old age, etc.).19 Nevertheless, the 2012 Recommendation
No. 202 on national floors of social protection does contain some explicit references to social
assistance.20 Indeed, the relevance of social assistance for the establishment of social protection
floors was highlighted in the General Survey concerning Recommendation No. 202, published in
February 2019. In particular, the Survey stressed that, ‘while relief and anti-poverty measures
provide some form of protection and constitute an essential component of social protection floors
in many countries, securing a life in health and decency for all people requires the establishment of
other types of social security measures, such as tax-funded social assistance and adapted social
insurance mechanisms enshrined in law which are sustainable, rights-based and provide adequate
levels of protection.’21
European regional standards
Against this background of the highly developed nature of the general safety net, it is not
surprising that the fundamental right to social assistance in Europe is often treated as an inde-
pendent category. The most profiled in this respect is Article 13 ESC recognising a right to social
and medical assistance for persons who have no means of subsistence. The core of Article 13
ensures that that any person who is without adequate resources and who is unable to secure such
resources by his own efforts or from other sources, in particular by benefits under a social
security scheme, should be granted adequate assistance, and, in case of sickness, the care
necessitated by his condition.
Article 13 ESC is formulated as a supplement to the broader Article 12 ESC that relates to the
right to social security and is separate from Article 14 ESC that specifically relates to social care.
All these rights contribute their own part to the purpose of Article 30 ESC, namely the right to
protection against poverty and social exclusion.
In the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the right to social security and the
right to social assistance are brought together in a single article (Article 34). Also of interest is
Article 1 of the EU Charter, which, like Article 1 of the German Constitution, refers to the
inviolability of human dignity. This article has been used by the German courts to develop a right
to an Existenzminimum (see Section 6.1 below.1), but there are also indications that it may have
significance in the law-making of the CJEU regarding, among other things, minimum reception
standards for asylum seekers.22
19. Cf. Vonk (2013).
20. Ibid, see paragraphs 8(b) and 9(3). Moreover, the latter provision does not express an exclusive preference for social
assistance as an instrument for creating a safety net. Literally: ‘Schemes providing such benefits may include universal
benefit schemes, social insurance schemes, social assistance schemes, negative income tax schemes, public employ-
ment schemes and employment support schemes’.
21. General Survey concerning the Social Protection Floors Recommendation, 2012 (202), 87.
22. Case C-79/13 Saciri and others [2014] ECLI: C:2014:103, in which Art. 1 of the Charter was used to guarantee the
adequacy of benefits under the Reception Directive for asylum seekers 2003/9. For an example in which Article 34 of
the Charter was used as a direct basis for the interpretation of a legal dispute about the application of EU law, in this
case the right to housing for a permanent resident in Italy, see Case C-571/10 Kamberaj [2012] ECLI: C:2012:233.
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It is interesting to note that the latest catalogue of rights in the EU, the non-binding European
Pillar of Social Rights (2017), recognises a right to assistance as part of a broader notion of
minimum income protection. Under the title minimum income, principle 14 states that everyone
lacking sufficient resources has the right to adequate minimum income benefits ensuring a life in
dignity at all stages of life, and effective access to enabling goods and services. Although it is still
unclear what the significance is of this new formulation, it attests to an evolution in thinking
towards a broader notion of a minimum income which can be realised through different types of
minimum income benefits, not necessarily only by schemes that qualify as social assistance. That
is quite a novel approach.
Finally, within the regional European context, the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) should not remain unmentioned. This Convention is rapidly gaining in importance for
social rights.23 The right to life (Article 2) and the prohibition of torture and degrading treatment
(Article 3) play a role in this. According to the ECtHR, the Convention does not guarantee, as
such, socio-economic rights, including the right to claim financial assistance from a State to
maintain a certain level of living.24 But this does not mean that, in situations of extreme need,
some government obligation to provide protection is totally ruled out.25 In this way, the ECtHR
is creating a ‘safety net under the safety net’ to prevent people from totally falling into the abyss.
Where such a fall is imminent and an individual is completely dependent on the government,26
an obligation of state support may come into play. The ECHR is also relevant from the perspec-
tive of other fundamental rights, such as the principle of non-discrimination. The much-
discussed Gaygusuz-judgement of the European Court of Human Rights of 16 September
199627 is an illustration of this. In this judgment, the Court ruled for the first time that unequal
treatment in social security (in casu: unemployment assistance for the long term unemployed)
solely on nationality grounds constitutes a violation of Article 14 of the ECHR, unless it is
justified by very weighty reasons.
African regional standards
The right to social security, and for that matter the right to social assistance, is not specifically
protected in the AU’s African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (1982) (also known as the
Banjul Charter; ratified by all 55 AU Member States). Nevertheless, as noted by the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACmHPR) in its Principles and Guidelines on the
Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, this right can be derived from a joint reading of a number of rights guaranteed
under the Charter including (but not limited to) the rights to life, dignity, liberty, work, health,
food, protection of the family and the right to the protection of the aged and the disabled, in
addition to be strongly affirmed in international law.28 The ACmHPR further stresses that the right
23. Cf. Koch (2009) and Leijten (2018).
24. Pancenko v Latvia Application No 40772/98, Admissibility, 28 October 1999.
25. Hunde v The Netherlands Application No 17931/16, Admissibility, 26 July 2007.
26. As was the case in Case of M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece Application No 30696/09, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 21
January 2011.
27. Gaygusuz v Austria Application No 19371/90, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 16 September 1996.
28. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Principles and guidelines on the implementation of economic,
social and cultural rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission on Human and
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to social security imposes, amongst others, an obligation on States parties to ensure a minimum
level of support and to adopt social assistance measures.29
Similarly, the AU Social Policy Framework argues for the extension of social protection
through measures that include publicly financed, non-contributory cash transfers.30 The Frame-
work notes that there is a consensus that a minimum package of essential social protection should
cover: basic health care, and benefits for children, informal workers, the unemployed, older
persons and persons with disabilities. The idea of a minimum package of support that should be
extended to vulnerable persons is also reflected in other AU instruments, notably the Social
Protection Plan for the Informal Economy and Rural Workers (SPIREWORK).31 In fact, there
is a clear tendency for recent AU legal instruments concerning particular vulnerable groups to
include social protection, as well as social assistance, as critical components. For example, the AU
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Older Persons in
Africa (2016), among others, stipulates that States’ Parties shall ensure that, in the event of
incapacity, older persons shall be provided with legal and social assistance in order to make
decisions that are in their best interests and promote their wellbeing (Article 5(2). Moreover,
several other (binding) AU instruments also provide for social assistance support, often within
the framework of the broader entitlement to social security or protection.
At the sub-regional level, the most prominent attention paid to social assistance is visible in
several instruments of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Its Protocol on
Employment and Labour (2014) enjoins each State Party to aim at developing an integrated and
comprehensive social protection system which ensures meaningful coverage of all through social
protection programmes, including social assistance (Art 11(3)(a)). Article 11(1)(b) provides that
persons who are unable to enter or re-enter the labour market and have no means of subsistence
shall be entitled to receive sufficient resources and social assistance.32 Other provisions of the
Protocol contain more specific references to social assistance, meant to cover particular contexts.
Also, the 2007 Code on Social Security in the SADC provides that everyone in the SADC who has
insufficient means of subsistence to support themselves and their dependents should be entitled to
social assistance, in accordance with the level of socio-economic development of the particular
Member State (par 5.1).
Finally, it is noteworthy to point at the jurisprudence in relation to vulnerability emanating from
decisions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACmHPR) and the African
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) with reference to rights enshrined in the African
Peoples’ Rights, 2010), available at: http://www.achpr.org/instruments/economic-social-cultural/ [last accessed 2
October 2018], at para 81.
29. Ibid, at para 82(a). It is noteworthy that per the African Union Executive Council decision, a mandate was given for the
development of an additional protocol to the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Citizens to
Social Protection and Social Security. The accompanying text of the decision endorses the pursuit of a rights-based
approach to social protection and social security for all citizens, aiming at inclusive development that leaves no one
behind, through appropriate legal and policy frameworks, complementing the African Charter.
30. CAMSD/EXP/4(I), Social Policy Framework for Africa First Session of the AU Conference of Ministers in Charge of
Social Development (2008) at para 31.
31. LSC/EXP/5(VIII), Social Protection Plan for the Informal Economy and Rural Workers 2011-15 (SPIREWORK) 8th
Ordinary Session of the Labour and Social Affairs Commission of the African Union (2011), at paras 10, 27.
32. Similarly, Article 14(b) stipulates that, ‘‘Every worker who has reached retirement age but who is not entitled to a
pension or who does not have other means of subsistence shall be entitled to adequate social assistance to cater
specifically for basic needs including medical care’’.
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Charter on Human and People’s Rights and in other human rights instruments falling under its
jurisdiction. One could say that this jurisprudence mirrors the case law of the ECtHR referred to
above, in the sense that it recognises state obligations to alleviate vulnerability in a variety of
situations, without actually embracing a general right to social assistance as such. Thus, for
example, in applying principles of equality in the enjoyment of rights and freedoms, the Court
and Commission have confirmed the operation of the principles in favour of among others indi-
genous people exposed to prejudicial treatment33; to persons with a mental disability or judicially
interdicted persons owing to their mental health conditions34; and to detained women subject to
acts of gender-based violence35; but not in relation to (government) workers voluntarily participat-
ing in privatised pensions schemes.36 Also the right to life,37 said to include the right to dignity38
has come into play in the jurisprudence, as has the right to health.39 The Commission held, for
example, that the failure to provide basic services such as safe drinking water and electricity and
the shortage of medicine constituted a violation of the right to health.40 Similarly, the destruction
of homes, livestock and farms as well as the poisoning of water sources, such as wells, exposed the
victims to serious health risks and amounted similarly to a violation of this right.41
Legal nature of the fundamental right of social assistance
The fundamental right of social assistance, whether or not as part of the right to social security, is a
socio-economic human right. Traditionally legal doctrine has considered these rights as mere
programmatic instruction norms for the government, not as legally enforceable rights. Nowadays,
according to the canon of the international human rights community, all fundamental rights are
‘indivisible, interdependent and interrelated’.42 If human rights are truly indivisible, then the legal
character of social rights should be brought more into line with the legal effect which is generally
attributed to civil human rights. But not everyone holds this opinion, and legal doctrine in many
countries still does not agree with this ideal. Nonetheless, it is not disputed that fundamental social
rights do at least create certain obligations for the government.
What then is the legal nature of these obligations? This question opens the Pandora’s Box of
national and international theory on fundamental social rights. To avoid confusion, we refer to the
approach adopted in the General Comment No. 19 (2008) of the Committee of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (CESCR), as a legally non-binding yet authoritative source of interpretation.
33. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v Republic of Kenya (Application No 006/2012, judgment of 26
May 2017); The Nubian Community in Kenya v The Republic of Kenya (Application No 317/2006).
34. Purohit and Moore v Gambia (Application No 241/2006).
35. Egyptian Initiative for Persona Rights and Interights v Egypt (Application 323/2006).
36. Dabalorivhuwa Patriotic Front v South Africa (Application No 335/06).
37. Art 4 of the Charter.
38. Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Another v Sudan (2009) AHLRL 153 (ACHPR 2009); Communication 279/
2003. Additionally, Art 5 of the Charter provides for the right to dignity and physical and mental integrity.
39. Article 16(1) states that, ‘‘Every individual has a right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health’’;
Article 16(2) provides that ‘‘States parties to the present Charter shall take all necessary measures to protect the health
of citizens and ensure that they receive medical attention when they are sick.’’
40. Free Legal Assistance Group and Others v Zaire Communications 25/89, 47/90, 56/91 and 100/93.
41. Sudan Human Rights Organisation and Another v Sudan (2009) AHLRL 153 (ACHPR 2009); Communication 279/
2003 par 212.
42. Taken from the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, endorsed by the UNGA in: GA Res 48/121, World
Conference on Human Rights, 20 December 1993, A/RES/48/121.
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General Comment No. 19 attempts to establish the effect and the normative content of the funda-
mental right to social security set out in Article 9 ICESR. In line with the other general comments,
General Comment No. 19 also distinguishes between three kinds of obligations: (a) to respect, (b)
to protect and (c) to fulfil.
It is also certainly not the case that it is primarily the state that is called upon to take charge of the
social security system. On the contrary, the document formulates a hands-off policy as the first
obligation for the state. The government must respect non-state support systems; these may not be
the subject of negative interventions. This is the duty to respect. Furthermore, existing private and
collective social security must be given legal protection by a regulatory and financial framework. This
is the duty to protect. General Comment No. 19 only sees a role for the state as a direct provider of social
security in situations where people are no longer protected against poverty and the traditional social
risks. Obligations relating to this fall under the duty to fulfil. Creating entitlements for everyone at a
minimum level is a direct obligation for the government, at least inasmuch as the individual or society
can no longer guarantee the safety net.43 This is a fortified government obligation. For extra minimal
(additional) protection, the state’s obligation is less far reaching: developing a policy framework for
social security is sufficient. It is submitted that this fortified government obligation for ‘non-
contributory schemes or other social assistance measures’ is not based on a coincidence; it stems from
the role that social assistance fulfils as the last safety net in the system of social security as a whole.
In line with its own tradition, the CESCR has also formulated the minimum core of the right to
social security. This minimum core is, inter alia, to ensure access to the minimum essential level of
social security that is essential for acquiring water and sanitation, foodstuffs, essential primary
health care and basic shelter and housing, and the most basic forms of education. Also, access to
social security must be ensured on a non-discriminatory basis, especially for disadvantaged or
marginalized groups.44
Substantive meaning of the fundamental right of social assistance
According to the CESCR, the concept of social assistance is part of the right to social security set
out in Article 9 ICESCR. But as far as the content of the fundamental right to social assistance is
concerned, General Comment No. 19 does not become very concrete; neither do the general
comments dealing with other relevant socio-economic fundamental rights.45
ILO Recommendation No. 202 on national floors of social protection contains some references
to social assistance as an instrument to achieve a minimum level of protection. For example,
paragraph 9(3) indicates that social assistance has a role to play here, alongside other methods
of income protection such as social insurance and forms of negative income tax. This is a testimony
to the existence and the importance of social assistance in achieving a minimum level of protec-
tion, but we are still left in the dark as to the substantive meaning of social assistance.
For concrete substantive norms we must therefore leave the global forum and revert to the
regional and national level. Below, we focus specially on the ESC which, as already mentioned,
formulates an independent right to assistance in Article 13. The supervisory body for the ESC, the
ECSR has collected its supervisory findings in a document dating back to 2008: Digest of the Case
43. UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social Security (art.
9), 4 February 2008, at paragraph 50.
44. Ibid, at paragraph 59.
45. Such as General Comments No. 4 (housing), No. 12 (adequate food) and No. 15 (water).
228 European Journal of Social Security 21(3)
Law of the European Committee of Social Rights.46 This Digest also contains an explanation of the
interpretation of the right to social assistance set out in Article 13 ESC. It is a ten-page exegesis,
not legally binding in the formal sense of the word, but nonetheless an authoritative source of
interpretation. African treaty bodies have not (yet) developed a social assistance doctrine as
specific as the ECSR; at least not beyond the jurisprudence referred in Section 3 ‘The place of
the fundamental right of social assistance’.
The ECSR has tried to steer clear of the controversial issue regarding the difference between
social security and social assistance by using its own definition of social assistance. It thus con-
siders as social assistance benefits for which individual need is the main criterion for eligibility,
without any requirement of affiliation to a social security scheme aimed to cover a particular risk,
or any requirement of professional activity or payment of contributions. According to the Com-
mittee, social assistance must be an individual statutory right, supported by an effective appeal
procedure. Furthermore, social assistance should have a universal personal scope of application:
every individual is to be covered solely on account of his or her needy situation. The minimum
amount of payments is linked to the average income of families in a country. The Committee
considers that social assistance is appropriate when the monthly amount of the (basic and/or
supplementary) benefits paid to a single person is not clearly below 50 per cent of the so-called
medium equivalent income in a country. Social assistance must be provided as long as the need
continues. Apart from the training and work requirement, the right to social assistance can only be
made dependent on the criterion of need. Reducing or suspending social assistance benefits by
means of sanctions can only be in line with the Charter if it does not deprive those concerned of the
means of their livelihood and it is possible to appeal against a decision.47
A final observation concerns the legal status of foreign nationals. The Committee considers that
it is permissible for European states to use minimum periods of residence for the right to equal
treatment, but not when it comes to providing emergency assistance to those in need. According to
the Committee, emergency assistance should be provided to all, with the understanding that it does
not concern the provision of regular minimum benefits, but forms of assistance intended to relieve
the emergency situation. The ECSR has issued a number of important rulings in collective com-
plaints procedures about the right to emergency assistance for foreign nationals who do not have
legal residence, in particular asylum seekers who have exhausted all legal remedies.48
Implementation of the fundamental right of social assistance in
Germany, the Netherlands and South Africa
Germany
The catalogue of basic rights in the German constitution does not contain an explicit reference to a
right to social assistance. Not long after the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany,
46. Officially referred to as: Council of Europe, Digest of the Case Law of the European Committee of Social Rights
(European Committee of Social Rights, 2008), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a3f52482.html.
47. For more about this test, see Eleveld (2016).
48. Defence for Children International v The Netherlands Application No 47/2008, Committee Decision, 20 October 2009;
Conference of European Churches v The Netherlands Application No 90/2013, Committee Decision, 10 November
2014; European Federation of National Organisations Working with the Homeless (FEANTSA) v The Netherlands
Application No 86/2012, Committee Decision, 10 November 2014.
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however, the country’s Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) developed a general right
to a guaranteed subsistence minimum (Garantie des Existenzminimums).49 This unwritten right
builds upon two basic rights laid down in Articles 1(1) and 20(1) of the German Constitution.
Article 1(1) addresses the inviolable human dignity, which is protected by granting individuals a
right to a guaranteed existence minimum. Article 20(1), which formulates the social state principle,
has a more programmatic character: it obliges the state to enact legislation which materialises the
social rights of the citizens. The central piece of legislation in the area – the German Social
Security Code (Sozialgesetzbuch), is a central example of the concretisation of this general basic
right.50
The legal nature of the basic right to a guaranteed subsistence minimum has long been subject of
controversy. In the early case law following a judgment from 1951, the Constitutional Court firmly
rejected the justiciability of this right by referring to the responsibility of the national parliament to
concretise it in subsequent legislation.51 The judges saw a role for the basic right in court pro-
ceedings only in the extreme case of arbitrary shortcomings of the legislature. This stance
remained unchanged until a ground-breaking judgment of the Constitutional Court from 2010.52
The Court recognised for the first time that the national constitution confers a direct, subjective
right to a guaranteed subsistence minimum that can be invoked to support individual claims before
courts of justice. The justiciability of the basic right was thus officially recognised, notwithstand-
ing an important limitation. The open character of the right to an existence minimum still requires a
respective national legal act that determines the nature and the scope of the state support. Accord-
ingly, judges will not honour individual claims for the provision of social assistance based on this
basic right. Instead, the proceedings must be used as a weapon to force the legislature to adopt
respective legislation that fulfils certain qualitative criteria. In that sense, the basic right to social
assistance conferred by the German constitution can be regarded as a recht auf recht, i.e. as right to
have one’s right confirmed in court.53
The normative content of the right to a guaranteed subsistence minimum has two dimensions.54
The first one addresses the physical existence of the individual and covers the expenses necessary
for food, clothing, accommodation, heating, hygiene and health. The second dimension is of a
socio-cultural character – it aims to ensure the possibility of maintaining interpersonal relation-
ships, as well as a basic level of participation in social, cultural and political life. This normative
content must be respected by the legislature when implementing the basic right into social assis-
tance legislation. The amount of social assistance benefits paid is determined in a procedure which
calculates the standard needs in an abstract manner (so-called Regelbedarf). The 2010 judgment of
the Constitutional Court clearly outlines a set of requirements which must be met by the legis-
lature. In the first place, the calculation of the standard needs must be realistic and it must be the
outcome of a systematic, transparent procedure. The determination of the standard needs is not a
49. Cf., inter alia, Ko¨nemann (2005), Banafsche (2015), and Gru¨ner (2009).
50. This relationship is made explicit in § 1(1) SGB I, § 1 (1) SGB II and § 1 (1) SGB XII which create a direct link between
the purposes of social assistance and the guarantee of an existence minimum as a component of the protection of the
human dignity.
51. BVerfGE 1, 97 (19 December 1951).
52. BVerfGE 125, 175 (09 February 2010).
53. See Mayen (2012)at 1451-1474, 1460 with reference to Enders, ‘Die Menschenwu¨rde in der Verfassungsordnung’, pp.
501-502 (Tu¨bingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997).
54. BVerfGE 125, 175 at 223 (09 February 2010).
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one-off action – instead, the state is obliged to continuously monitor the scope of granted social
assistance and, where necessary, adjust it in accordance with the most recent economic develop-
ments. In the second place, the benefit level may not be ‘evidently insufficient’ to address the two
dimensions of the basic right. When reviewing the conformity of national legislation with the right
to a guaranteed subsistence minimum, the Constitutional Court observes a margin of appreciation
which is awarded to the legislature. This margin of appreciation is narrower with regard to the
physical dimension of the right and broader in the context of its socio-cultural dimension.55
In cases where the adopted legislation does not live up to the qualitative expectations set by the
basic right to a guaranteed existence minimum, individuals can invoke their right before a national
court. If the judicial review supports the conclusion that some of the requirements described above
have not been met, the court can declare the national legal act unconstitutional and impose a
deadline on the state to enact new legislation. The Constitutional Court took this step in the above-
mentioned 2010 judgment, after reaching the conclusion that the legislature did not apply the
statistical model for the determination of the standard needs in a coherent manner. A similar
outcome was reached in a subsequent judgment from 2012, where the Court ruled that the social
assistance granted to asylum seekers was evidently insufficient, given that the level of benefits had
not been revised since 1993.56
Interestingly, the impact of the international right of social assistance on the German legal order
has been limited. This is partially related to the strong foundation provided by the national
constitution. A related explanation is that Article 13 ESC and Article 9 ICESCR are regarded as
obligations of the state under international law, meaning that they lack direct applicability in the
German legal system. These articles can only be taken into account indirectly, as part of the
doctrine of ‘international law friendliness’ of the German Constitution, which allows judges to
interpret national legislation in conformity with international obligations only where the German
legislature has not explicitly deviated from the international legal provisions. Sporadically, some
of the international instruments may be briefly mentioned in national court rulings, without
attributing any further importance to their normative content.57
The Netherlands
As far as the Dutch Constitution is concerned, we should first establish that a provision on social
assistance, or rather, its predecessor in the form of poor relief, is much older than the cluster of
fundamental social rights that have been added to the Constitution during the last review in 1983.
The first Constitution of 1815 contained an article that entrusts ‘poor relief and the education of
poor children’ to ‘the sustained care of the government.’ The background to this provision, which
has existed in various formulations up to the constitutional revision of 1983, is the acknowledge-
ment that the government bears primary responsibility for the organisation of poor relief in relation
to the church and civic private initiatives. In the 19th century, this primacy was not yet a matter of
course. According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the last constitutional revision of 1983, the
then existing constitutional clause on poor relief carried the ‘stamp of a bygone period.’58 Instead,
55. Ibid, at 225.
56. BVerfGE 132, 134 (20 June 2012).
57. An example can be found in the above-mentioned case concerning social assistance for asylum seekers, cf. BVerfGE
132, 134 at 154 (20 June 2012).
58. Parliamentary papers, TK 1975-1976, 13 873, No. 3, 12.
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the right to social assistance had to be formulated in accordance with the principles of the post war
social assistance act which was no longer based upon a charitable obligation but upon a right.
Article 20 of the Dutch Constitution now reads as follows:
1. It shall be the concern of the authorities to secure the means of subsistence of the population
and to achieve the distribution of wealth.
2. Rules concerning entitlement to social security shall be laid down by Act of Parliament.
3. Dutch nationals resident in the Netherlands who are unable to provide for themselves shall
have a right, to be regulated by Act of Parliament, to assistance from the authorities.
Note that only the right to social assistance in Article 20(3) of the Constitution is formulated as a
subjective right, be it ‘to be regulated by Act of Parliament’. The broader right to social security in
20(2) does not have this privileged treatment.
According to the Dutch courts, Article 20 is not justiciable.59 Moreover, Dutch courts are not
empowered to test the constitutionality of formal acts of parliament.60 Together, this prevents the
courts from investigating the meaning of this fundamental right and its possible relevance in the
actual dispute. This also applies for Article 20(3) of the Dutch Constitution, even though this
clause has been formulated as a subjective right. According to the courts, it is not the Constitution
but rather the relevant social assistance act that must serve as a benchmark for the adjudication of
rights.61
The courts show less restraint when it comes to upholding civil and political fundamental rights
in the area of social assistance. This subject plays a role, inter alia, in the question of whether
irregular foreign nationals should receive (emergency) assistance, which is not possible according
to the present social assistance act, the Participatiewet (Participation Act).62 The highest social
security court, the Central Appeals Tribunal (Centrale Raad van Beroep, CRvB), has formulated
an exception for persons in medical need, by referring to the obligations contained in Article 8
ECHR.63 Another exception has been made in relation to children of failed asylum seekers. On 21
September 2012, the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad, HR) concluded that there is an obligation
to provide care for these children, on grounds of a whole complex of international and European
standards being invoked, without making a formal distinction between civil and political funda-
mental rights and socio-economic fundamental rights.64
The State has the obligation to safeguard the rights and interests of minors who are on its
territory, including foreign national minors without a valid residence permit, partly because they
cannot be held responsible for the conduct of their family members. This is supported by the case
59. For recent examples CRvB 22 December 2013 ECLI: NL: CRVB: 2013, 2161; CRvB 13 February 2015, ECLI: NL:
CRvB: 2015: 364 and CRvB 22 December 2015, ECLI: NL: CRVB: 2015, 4737.
60. Article 120, Constitution.
61. For a recent example see CRvB June 19, 2017, ECLI: NL: CRVB: 2017: 2810: ‘‘The court rightly considered that the
appellant cannot directly derive the right to assistance from Article 20(3) of the Dutch Constitution. The legislature has
regulated the right to assistance in the Participation Act. Whether or not there is a genuine entitlement to assistance
should be assessed based on this act. Whether or not the provisions set out in the Participation Act are in conflict with
this constitutional provision cannot be assessed, since the court does not, pursuant to Article 120 of the Dutch Con-
stitution, act to review the constitutionality of laws’’.
62. Article 112(2) and 16(2) Participatiewet.
63. CRvB 29 April 2010, ECLI: NL: CRVB:2010: BM0956.
64. HR 21 September 2012, ECLI: NL: HR:2012:328.
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law of the ECtHR, the principles underlying the Reception Directive and the Return Directive and
the ESRR and Committee of Ministers’ position adopted on the basis of the ESC.
The question regarding the effect of the fundamental right to social assistance in the Dutch legal
system came to the fore following the ECSR’s opinion of 10 November 2014 in complaint no. 90/
2013, CEC v. the Netherlands. In this, the Netherlands was accused in very strong terms of
violating the ESC, in particular the right to equal treatment in access to social assistance (Article
13(4) ESC) and the right to care (Article 31(2) ESC). According to the government, this opinion
of the ECSR should remain without consequences because such opinions have no binding legal
force. But the preliminary relief judge of the Central Appeals Tribunal already ordered the
municipality of Amsterdam by way of a provisional remedy to provide night care during
the winter including a shower, a meal and breakfast.65 This refers to the night shelter that,
on the basis of the 2015 Dutch Social Support Act, other homeless people also use. The
preliminary relief judge considered that even if the provisions set out in the ESC are not
justiciable, this does not automatically imply that they are meaningless for the assessment of
requests for care. Thus, Article 13 ESC began to gain a foothold in Dutch legal doctrine.
Nevertheless, on 26 November 2015, the highest administrative appeal court ruled that munici-
palities may refuse care and assistance to irregular foreign nationals and may refer them to
expulsion centres.66 This was contrary to the express opinion of the CESR. The administrative
appeals court summarized the status of the relevant ESC-rights as follows:
The [ . . . ] provisions [ . . . ] of the ESC [ . . . ] do not lend themselves for direct application by the courts.
Furthermore, decisions of the ECSR are not binding on the contracting parties, so that no direct claims
can be derived from them in proceedings such as these. Such decisions are, however, authoritative [ . . . ]
Decisions by the ECSR may play a role in the interpretation and application of other - directly applicable -
provisions, such as Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR. However, this does not detract from the fact that in the
end the interpretation given by the ECtHR to the latter treaty provisions is decisive.
With this judgment, the Court carefully removed the fundamental right of social assistance from
the judiciary’s menu, at least for the time being.
South Africa67
In its entrenched Bill of Rights chapter, the South African Constitution of 1996 recognises that
access to social assistance is both an individual right and a state obligation – although, as indicated
below, private role-players are not divested from their constitutional duties in this regard. It affirms
the universal right to access to social security, including appropriate social assistance for those
unable to support themselves and their dependants (section 27(1)(c)), and orders the state to take
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive
realisation of these rights (section 27(2)). It needs to be pointed out that no reference is made in the
Bill of Rights to the distinction traditionally drawn between first-, second- and third-generation
rights. Social rights thus have exactly the same status as other civil and political rights. The lack
of differentiation between these apparent ‘categories’ emphasises the notion that the rights are
65. Preliminary relief court CRvB 17 December 2014, ECLI: NL: CRVB: 2014: 4178.
66. ABRvSt26 November 2015, ECLI: NL: RVS:2015:3415 and CRvB 26 November 2015, ECLI: NL: CRVB:2015:3803.
67. See, among others, Liebenberg (2014) and Olivier (2003).
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inter-related, interdependent and indivisible.68 They are in fact capable of enforcement – the
legislature or executive can be ordered to take action or be required to consider and arrange for
a more equal distribution. The Constitutional Court is specifically empowered to decide that
Parliament, or the President, has failed to comply with a constitutional duty (see section
167(4)(e) of the Constitution). In addition, constitutionally-speaking, wide-ranging remedies are
at the disposal of the courts. Courts may therefore require the state to review programmes and
policies. In certifying the draft text of the 1996 Constitution, the Constitutional Court stressed that
the socio-economic rights contained in the Constitution are justiciable, even though the inclusion
of the rights may have direct financial and budgetary implications.69 In fact, where necessary, the
court will also allow a class action to be brought before it, in order to protect the interests of
the poor and vulnerable, in particular.70 Also, section 167(5) of the Constitution stipulates that the
Constitutional Court makes the final decision whether an Act of Parliament, a provincial Act or
conduct of the President is constitutional, and must confirm any order of invalidity made by the
Supreme Court of Appeal, the High Court of South Africa, or a court of similar status, before that
order has any force. Also, only the Constitutional Court may decide on the constitutionality of any
parliamentary or provincial Bill (section 167(4)(b)).
The South African Constitution contains important provisions regarding the role and impor-
tance of international law. The Constitution generally supports an international law-friendly
approach. It stipulates that to the extent South Africa has ratified international instruments, it is
bound by their standards and provisions (section 231(1)). However, as a rule, any international
agreement becomes law in the Republic only when it is enacted into law (i.e., incorporated) by
national legislation (section 231(4)). According to the Constitutional Court, incorporation trans-
forms relevant provisions of international agreements into statutory rights and obligations, to be
enforced on par with national legislation.71 Also, section 232 stipulates that customary interna-
tional law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of
Parliament. Furthermore, when interpreting fundamental rights contained in the Bill of Rights,
courts, tribunals and forums must consider international law. According to the Constitutional
Court, the international law referred to includes both binding and non-binding international law
68. See among others Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the
RSA, 1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC); 1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC).
69. Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re: Certification of the Constitution of the RSA, 1996 supra
pars 76–78 at 77. See also Government of the RSA v Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC); 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) at para
20.
70. See section 38 of the Constitution. In Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Gov-
ernment v Ngxuza 2001 10 BCLR 1039 (A); 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) the court commented on the institution of a class
action in circumstances where disability grants were suspended unilaterally by the responsible provincial government:
‘‘The situation seemed pattern-made for class proceedings. The class the applicants represent is drawn from the very
poorest within our society – those in need of statutory social assistance. . . . It is the needs of such persons, who are most
lacking in protective and assertive armour that the Constitutional Court has repeatedly emphasised must animate our
understanding of the Constitution’s provisions. And it is against the background of their constitutional entitlements that
we must interpret the class action provision in the Bill of Rights’’. See also See also Mashavha v President of the RSA
2004 12 BCLR 1243 (CC).
71. Glenister v President of the RSA 2011 3 SA 347 (CC); 2011 7 BCLR 651 (CC) pars 99, 100, 102, 181. See also Azanian
Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) v President of the RSA 1996 8 BCLR 1015 (CC); 1996 4 SA 671 (CC) par 26.
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– i.e. also international instruments not binding on South Africa.72 This has major implications
when courts and arbitrators consider the interpretation and application of the constitutional right to
fair labour practices and other fundamental rights. Also, there is a constitutional preference for
statutory interpretation which is aligned to international law. Section 233 stipulates: ‘When inter-
preting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that
is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with
international law.’
The nature and purpose of the constitutional right to access to social assistance, and its inter-
relationship with other fundamental rights, have continually been indicated by the South African
Constitutional Court. In Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom,73 the Court
stated that, if under section 27 ‘[t]he state has in place programmes to provide adequate social
assistance to those who are otherwise unable to support themselves and their dependants, that
would be relevant to the state’s obligations in respect of other socio-economic rights.’74 Also,
when considering the purpose of providing access to social security to those in need, the Court
noted that: ‘A society had to attempt to ensure that the basic necessities of life were accessible to all
if it was to be a society in which human dignity, freedom and equality were foundational. The right
of access to social security, including social assistance, for those unable to support themselves and
their dependants was entrenched because society in the RSA valued human beings and wanted to
ensure that people were afforded their basic needs.’
The application of the above constitutional principles in the area of social assistance is clearly
illustrated in the Khosa case, dealing with the exclusion of permanent residents from the purview
of the South African social assistance system.75 The court once again stressed the importance of
adopting a holistic approach which takes into account the fact that all rights are interrelated,
interdependent and equally important, the availability of human and financial resources in deter-
mining whether the state has complied with the constitutional standard of reasonableness, and
other factors that may be relevant in a given case.76 The Court noted the operation of the consti-
tutional right to equal treatment (section 9) and held that to exclude permanent residents from
entitlement to social assistance would fundamentally affect their human dignity as well.
As is evident from Khosa and other Constitutional Court judgments, there is a specific consti-
tutional focus on addressing the plight of the most vulnerable and desperate in society. In partic-
ular, where categories of people belonging to deprived and impoverished communities are
marginalised or excluded, and the right infringed is fundamental to their well-being, such as
appropriate social assistance, or adequate housing, the Constitutional Court appears to be willing
to intervene. This is, in particular, the case where the appellants are members of communities that
have been historically marginalised and/or excluded or appear to be particularly vulnerable.
72. Section 39(1)(b). See S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC); 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC); Government of RSA v
Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). See also Glenister v President of the RSA 2011 3 SA 347 (CC); 2011 7 BCLR
651 (CC) par 96.
73. Government of the RSA v Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC); 2001 1 SA 46 (CC). Cf. Liebenberg ‘The Right to
Social Assistance: The Implications of Grootboom for Policy Reform in South Africa’ (2001) 17 South African Journal
on Human Rights 232.
74. Ibid, para 35.
75. Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others 2004 6 BCLR 569; 2004 6 SA 505 (CC) at para 40.
76. Ibid, paras 43-44.
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Yet, as far as the constitutional standard to be met is concerned, the Court has consistently
rejected the adoption of a ‘minimum core’ approach, and has in fact emphasised that the consti-
tutional yardstick is that of reasonableness – i.e. whether, given the context concerned, it could be
said that the measures (whether legal or administrative) were indeed reasonable.77
Finally, the Constitutional Court has made it clear that both state and non-state actors bear
responsibility for giving effect to the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. From
Constitutional Court jurisprudence, it would appear that the state’s duty to realise the right to
access to social security and to social assistance may differ according to whether the ability of
those affected to realise the right is absent or not. While this principle still has to be concretised in
the area of social assistance, the Court has confirmed this in other areas. For example, where the
ability to afford, for instance, adequate housing exists, the state’s primary obligation is not that of
direct provider, but of ‘unlocking the system, providing access to housing stock and a legislative
framework to facilitate self-built houses through planning laws and access to finance.’ For those
who cannot afford to pay, issues of development and social welfare are raised.78 The point is that
state policy needs to address both these groups, and that the poor are particularly vulnerable and
that their needs and, therefore, require special attention. This was forcefully brought home in
another judgment, where the Constitutional Court assumed that flood victims left homeless have
a constitutional right to be provided with access to housing. In Minister of Public Works v Kyalami
Ridge Environmental Association,79 the Court had to deal with the erection of temporary transit
housing on state land for the victims.
Given the progressive nature of both the South African constitutional provisions and the con-
stitutional jurisprudence outlined above, the South African Constitutional Court does not have to
rely much on the international fundamental right of social assistance. Nevertheless, it has to be
borne in mind that the Court’s emphasis on social security and in particular social assistance must
be seen against the background of a desire to align the Constitution with basic human rights
principles as developed in international doctrine. Nevertheless, it is also clear that, to date, the
Court has not determined the specific content of the right to social assistance. Also, given the
approach adopted by the Constitutional Court in other matters, it is doubtful whether an individual
could lay claim to a specific form, or quantum, of social assistance.80
The Court will at least, so it seems, review existing policies, programmes and laws against a
(broad) constitutional standard, and may order the legislature to adopt, or adjust, existing legisla-
tion if this were to be found not to be appropriately aligned to the constitutional right to access
social assistance (using the reasonableness criterion). In addition, the Constitutional Court in
SANDU v Minister of Defence81 held that a litigant may not bypass available legislation covering
a particular matter and rely directly on the constitutional provision: the case should in the first
place be based on any legislation enacted to regulate the right – i.e. the provision of the applicable
law should be challenged on constitutional grounds if it is alleged that the law does not comply
with the constitutional prescripts.
77. It needs to be added that this persistent refusal is even more questionable following the ratification of the ICESCR by
South Africa in 2015.
78. Government of the RSA v Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC); 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) at para 36.
79. 2001 7 BCLR 652 (CC); 2001 3 SA 1151 (CC) at para 52.
80. To the same effect, see the Constitutional Court judgment in Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others
2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC); 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC).
81. [2007] 9 BLLR 785 (CC).
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Conclusions
In light of the analysis set out above, we can conclude that the fundamental right of social
assistance has gained normative recognition, both at an international level and at the national
constitutional level. On the basis of this article, which includes a study of two regions and three
countries, it is probably too early to conclude that there is a ‘universal recognition’ of this right.
Nonetheless, of importance here is the broad synergy discernible in the normative context not only
transgressing through, but also operating above the national constitutional jurisdictions. Legal
doctrine has embraced the notion of a government obligation to work towards a universal safety
net, which can be accessed by individuals by means of a right. The global, European and the
African instruments and standards all suggest that such a right should be recognised, even if this
result has been achieved via interpretation by supervisory and monitoring institutions in the form
of a derivative right to social assistance. In this context, we referred to a ‘fortified government
obligation’, which stems from the role that social assistance fulfils as the last safety net in the
system of social security as a whole.
Yet, it must be borne in-mind that this emerging normative consensus merely exists on an
abstract level. Not only have rights-based social assistance schemes not emerged everywhere in
reality, but also, as soon as the notion is to be translated in more concrete standards, the consensus
starts to falter. There are various ways states can work towards the objective of providing minimum
income protection to the most vulnerable citizens. The fundamental right to social assistance does
not really express a preference for a specific method. This is not even the case in Europe, where the
ECSR has developed its own doctrine on the interpretation of art. 13 of the ESC. This doctrine
embodies a broad definition of social assistance and includes a number of principles dealing with
the nature of the right (individual statutory right), the minimum level of benefits (50 per cent of the
median income equivalent), sanctions (not full) and the personal scope of application (universal).
Nevertheless, it is a still a far cry from prescribing a specific architecture for the social assistance
system. In our view, this is only for the good. From a human rights perspective, detailed system
prescriptions are unnecessary and a wide margin of discretion allows for flexibility for countries to
adjust their programmes to their own needs and political preferences. More concrete international
standards should rather be an ambition from the point of view of further global or regional social
integration; for example, as part of an EU effort to introduce a minimum income floor82 or as part
of the ILO standard-setting activities.
Another nuance to the universal character of the right to social assistance pertains to the second
element raised in our research question: what are the legal consequences if this right is invoked
before the national courts? It has become apparent that, in the national legal sphere, the application
of the fundamental right of social assistance can vary greatly. While Germany and South Africa
have developed a thriving constitutional doctrine relating to basic needs of the most vulnerable
groups in the society, the fundamental right to social assistance in the Netherlands lies almost
entirely dormant. Here, European standards are knocking on the door, but so far, they have not
been allowed except on the back of the ECHR or some other provision with direct effect.
Further, it has become apparent that courts are reluctant to base direct and concrete individual
entitlements to financial assistance or other types of government support solely on the fundamental
82. Such as Council Recommendation 92/441/EEC on common criteria concerning sufficient resources and social
assistance in social protection systems [1992] OJ L 245/46. No further binding measures have been taken within the EU
framework as of yet.
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right to social security. The doctrine clearly has embraced a rights-based approach and does
underpin the importance of a legal framework, but these are requirements that are imposed on
the legislature and/or on the executive when they design their social assistance schemes, not
anchors for allowing individual financial claims through the judiciary. As such, a rights-based
individual entitlement, read together with the state’s obligation to act, is generally restricted to
ensure that structural adjustments to social assistance design, regulation and execution are made. If
this is the case for the two countries (Germany and South Africa) that have been specifically
selected for the far-reaching powers of their constitutional courts and their thriving constitutional
doctrines on social human rights, the same is likely to be true for other countries where such
powers and doctrines are lacking. Nevertheless, this legal situation must not be confused with a
lack of justiciability, at least not necessarily. As the German and the South African cases show,
courts are prepared to apply a constitutional test to social assistance legislation on the basis of
individual claims. In our view, the importance of the fundamental right to social security is, indeed,
not the possibility of enforcing concrete benefits in individual court cases, but the possibility for an
individual to ask the court to address structural shortcomings in the existing architecture of social
assistance schemes. In this way, courts are placed in a position to critically review a system in light
of the fundamental right to social assistance and other human rights requirements. The German and
South African constitutional courts have taken up this role in an admirable manner. In contrast, the
Dutch courts have failed to give meaning to the fundamental right, with the result that, in the
Netherlands, essential values underlying the social assistance system are not addressed or recog-
nised as constitutional human rights.
While the German and the South African constitutional courts have not refrained from giving
concrete orders to the legislature, ultimately, real progress depends on the political will to coop-
erate in this process. Thus, for example, in South Africa, in light of the relevant constitutional
provisions and developing jurisprudence, it could be expected that the government would roll out a
comprehensive programme to realise a general safety net for all those people who are left unpro-
tected by the present system. Yet, at present, it is not doing so. Such failure may be signalled by the
courts or even actively repudiated, but it cannot be amended without the co-operation of the
legislature and government. The classical disconnect between constitutional rights and practice
is a more stubborn phenomenon in some parts of the world than in others.
A few comments concerning further research into social assistance as a human right can be
made. It is acknowledged that this research should be extended both in scope (covering more
regions and countries) and in depth. In particular, the question needs to be addressed of how the
human rights approach to social assistance can be reconciled with the inherent features of the
designs of many social assistance schemes, such as the exclusion of non-nationals, the prevalence
of administrative discretion, the low levels of benefit, civil society and third party involvement and
harsh entitlement conditions.
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